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STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN : 
ASSOCIATION OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
: Cert No. 
Respondent, 
vs. Category No. 13 
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC. 
and AIR TERMINAL GIFTS, INC., : Court of Appeals No. 
88-0331-CA 
Petitioner. : 
* * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
Respondent First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Salt 
Lake City (First Federal) disagrees with several statements of fact 
set forth by Petitioner Air Terminal Gifts, Inc. (Air Terminal). 
References are to the paragraph numbers in Air Terminal's Statement 
of Facts. 
1 and 4. Air Terminal asserts that the note and purchase 
agreement were an "integrated, package transaction", citing a 
conclusion of law by the District Court. The Court of Appeals was 
not bound by any conclusion of law by the District Court nor is the 
Supreme Court bound. There is no finding of fact that there was 
any integration. The only incorporation was contained in the 
security agreement which, in paragraph 2, stated in reference to 
the promissory note that it was "incorporated" within the security 
agreement. The note has no such incorporation. 
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8. Air Terminal states that the written list showing the 
purpose of the loan by First Federal was "in part to pay Gump & 
Ayers $18,500 and to cover the Morse shortfall" (emphasis added). 
The $18,500 was not in addition to the Morse shortfall but was a 
part of the Morse shortfall as shown by Exhibit G in Air Terminal's 
petition which lists Gump & Ayers' $18,500 under the heading ITEMS 
DUE TO MORSE SHORTFALL. 
12. Air Terminal asserts that the Court of Appeals' opinion 
concludes that "Gump & Ayers received no 'benefit' from the First 
Federal loan"e That is not a correct interpretation of the Court 
of Appeals' opinion which stated: 
There is no question that Gump & Ayers, as general 
partner of Sunayers, was a fiduciary to Air Terminal and 
that proceeds of the loan were used to satisfy debts of 
the Sunayers development project for which Air Terminal 
had given its note. However, Air Terminal cites no auth-
ority for the proposition that these facts alone esta-
blish that its note was negotiated "for the benefit" of 
Gump & Ayers. Furthermore, the case law interpreting 
provisions identical to §70A-3-304(2) require a more 
substantial link to the fiduciary's personal interests 
than exists here. 
ARGUMENT 
QUESTION I. Air Terminal asserts that the terms of the 
security agreement are incorporated within the note because of the 
provision in the note that 
reference is made to the purchase and security 
agreement for additional rights of the holder 
hereof. 
The reference is not an incorporation. The note does not "contain" 
the provisions of the security agreement. Consequently, there is 
no additional promise which would destroy negotiability. 
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In 5 Anderson Uniform Commercial Code, § 3-105.12 it is 
stated: 
A contemporaneous agreement is not neces-
sarily read together with an instrument for 
purposes of determining its negotiability, 
although the agreement and instrument may be 
read together for other purposes. 
In Section 3-119.3, Anderson states: 
The fact that a note is given in connec-
tion with a conditional sale does not affect 
the negotiability of the note because the con-
dition of the sales contract is not to be 
incorporated into the note. 
We concede that as between the original parties, the seller 
and the purchaser, the documents could be construed together. 
That is not true, however, in determining the negotiability of the 
note in the hands of a third party, and in determining whether or 
not the third party is a holder in due course. In the latter situ-
ation, the note is negotiable despite the reference to the security 
agreement and the third party is a holder in due course. 
There are various provisions in mortgages and other security 
instruments which, although if contained in the note itself would 
make the note conditional, do not make the note conditional when 
they are contained only in the security agreement. Examples are 
provisions for the protection of security and provisions for pay-
ment of taxes, both of which are indefinite in amount (5 Anderson 
3-106.15) 
A negotiable promissory note and contemporaneously executed 
mortgage will not be construed as one instrument where to do so 
renders the note non-negotiable. Bradley v. Buffinaton, 500 S.W.2d 
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314, (Mo.App. 1973). 
General rules of construction respecting contemporaneously 
executed instruments are inapplicable where negotiability of an 
instrument is involved, i.e., where it is in the hands of a holder 
in due course. McLean v. Paddock. 78 N.M. 234, 430 P.2d 392, 
(1967) . 
A note's negotiability must be determined by the terms on its 
face. In holding that a non-negotiable note could not be made 
negotiable by the terms of a separate document, the New Mexico 
Court stated: 
The whole purpose of the concept of a 
negotiable instrument under Article 3 is to 
declare that transferees in the ordinary course 
of business are only to be held liable for 
information appearing in the instrument itself 
and will not be expected to know of any limita-
tions on negotiability or changes in terms, 
etc., contained in any separate documents. The 
whole idea of the facilitation of easy transfer 
of notes and instruments requires that a trans-
feree be able to trust what the instrument 
says, and be able to determine the validity of 
the note and its negotiability from the lan-
guage in the note itself. First State Bank at 
Gallup v. Clark. 91 N.M. 117, 570 P.2d 1144, 
1147 (1977). 
Negotiability is determined from the face of the instrument 
without reference to extrinsic facts and "the conditional or uncon-
ditional character of the promise or order is to be determined by 
what is expressed in the instrument itself". Holsonback v. First 
State Bank of Albertville, 30 UCC Rep Serv 222, 224; 394 So2d 381 
(Ala App, 1980). 
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evidence that Morse has made any claim. Therefore, there is no 
basis for any indemnification. 
In the second place, even if there were a right of indemnifi-
cation, that would not make the note voidable. Here^ the Court of 
Appeals' reasoning was that any obligation to indemnify did not 
make the note "voidable" and that although there may be a claim by 
Air Terminal against Sunayers or Gump & Ayers because of this in-
demnification provision in the security agreement that is not some-
thing that makes the note voidable. The Court stated: 
In support of its holding, the court stated 
"[the]...inclusion of the word * voidable' [in 
U.C.C. §3-304(1)(b)]1 is meant to restrict the 
provision to notice of a defense which will 
permit any party to avoid his original obliga-
tion on the instrument as distinguished from 
a setoff or counterclaim." Id. (referring to 
the Official Comments to the Uniform Commercial 
Code). 
Similarly, The Purchase and Security Agre-
ement gives Air Terminal the right to indem-
nification from Sunayers for any reduction in 
capital of the Sunayers Limited Partnership 
resulting from the Morse Shortfall, but it does 
not render Air Terminal's obligation on the 
note voidable under §70A-3-304 (1) (b) . Instead, 
Air Terminal's right to partial indemnification 
from Sunayers is independent of its obligation 
to pay on the air Terminal note. Air Terminal 
may have a separate claim for indemnification 
against Sunayers or Gump & Ayers, but it cannot 
use this claim as a defense to its obligations 
to First Federal on the note. 
Air Terminal argues that the Appellate Court's decision is in 
conflict with Calfo v. D. C. Stewart Company, et al., 30 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8, 111 P.2d 697 (Utah 1986) concerning what constitutes notice 
1 
The negotiability of an instrument which contained all the 
elements of negotiability specified in the UCC was not affected by 
reference in the instrument to the transaction giving rise to the 
instrument. Federal Factors, Inc> v. Wellbanke, 3 UCC Rep Serv 
813; 241 Ark 44, 406 SW2d 712 (1966). 
The court in Northwestern Bank v. Neal, 25 UCC Rep Serv 487; 
248 SE2d 585 (S.C. 1978) quoted and relied upon the official com-
ment to UCC § 3-119(2): 
If the instrument itself states that it is 
subject to>or governed by, any other agreement, 
it is not negotiable under this Article; but 
if it merely refers to a separate agreement or 
states that it arises out of such an agreement, 
it is negotiable. 
QUESTION II. Air Terminal argues that because of an indem-
nification in the security agreement that the note is voidable. 
In the first place, there are no facts creating any right of 
indemnification. The indemnification agreement in paragraph 11 
excepts any losses "caused by specific acts or omissions of the 
purchaser" (Exhibit D to Air Terminal's brief). The purchaser is 
Air Terminal. Air Terminal performed a specific act in executing 
the note. It cannot now claim that it is being indemnified against 
liability on its own note. The other indemnification is contained 
in paragraph 12 of the security agreement which provides that 
Sunayers and Gump & Ayers will reimburse Air Terminal "for the 
reduction of the purchaser's portion of any distribution based 
upon any claims...by...Morse". There is no evidence that there is 
any reduction of any distribution to Air Terminal nor is there any 
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of potential infirmity, Calfo was cited for the proposition "when 
determining the negotiability, only the instrument in question 
should be examined", which is a correct interpretation of Calfo. 
This court in Calfo held that the note on its face contained lan-
guage which made it payable upon final closing "when Buyers exer-
cise their option to purchase". The court there correctly held 
that the note was conditional upon its face and was payable at an 
indefinite time and therefore, was not negotiable. The decision 
here is not in conflict with Calfo. 
QUESTION III. Air Terminal argues that knowledge that a fidu-
ciary received $18,500 of the Morse shortfall prohibited First 
Federal from being a holder in due course because of § 70A-3-3 04 
relating to a fiduciary's acting in breach of a fiduciary duty. 
Air Terminal eliminates the crucial phrase in quoting that section 
of the code which provides: 
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the 
instrument when he has knowledge that a fiduci-
ary has negotiated the instrument in payment 
of or as security for his own debt or in any 
transaction for his own benefit or otherwise 
in breach of duty. (emphasis added) 
Air Terminal omitted the last phrase "or otherwise in breach of 
duty". There was no breach of duty by Gump & Ayers in its borrow-
ing for and on behalf of the partnership Sunayers the $100,000 
merely because part of the Morse shortfall included money owed by 
Morse to Gump & Ayers. 
Also, subsection (2) relates to a transaction for the benefit 
of the fiduciary. This transaction was for the benefit of the 
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partnership to raise funds that the partnership needed to pay obli-
gations of the partnership incurred on the Sunflower project. 
There was therefore no breach of duty such as there would have been 
had the proceeds of the loan been intended for the personal use of 
the partner Gump & Ayers. 
Subsection (2) applies when the taker knows that notes held 
by a partnership are negotiated to it for a non-partnership pur-
pose. As stated in 5 Anderson Uniform Commercial Code § 3-304.29: 
When the taker knows that notes held by the 
partnership are negotiated to it for a non-
partnership purpose, the taker cannot be a 
holder in due course. 
Here the loan was for a partnership purpose of paying off the debts 
of the partnership. 
QUESTION IV. For the first time the argument is asserted by 
Air Terminal that, since the assignment was made as security for 
Gump & Ayers own $100,000 debt, that caused it to be for the 
benefit of Gump & Ayers and made the note was voidable. This was 
neither raised in the lower court nor in the Court of Appeals. 
However, the evidence in this case shows that Gump & Ayers, the 
fiduciary, was borrowing not for its own benefit but to raise funds 
for the partnership Sunayers. Exhibit G in Air Terminal's brief 
is captioned "Monies needed for Sunflower" and showed Gump & Ayers, 
the fiduciary, was borrowing to raise funds for Sunflower. No 
logical contention can be made that Gump & Ayers, by putting its 
own credit on the line for the partnership, was doing something 
that would make the note voidable. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Furthermore, Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
in setting forth what considerations govern review of certiorari 
sets forth four criteria. Only the fourth one appears to be 
relevant which is "when the Court of Appeals has decided an impor-
tant question of municipal, state or federal law which has not been 
but should be settled by this Court". The Court of Appeals deci-
sion applies provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code to the pecu-
liar facts of this case and relies upon the many decisions con-
struing same. There is no need for settlement by this Court. 
The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted this /d$<-> day of May, 1989. 
John W. Lowe 
Attorney for Respondent 
First Federal Savings & Loan 
Association of Salt Lake City 
Isl John W. Lo^e 
John W. Lowe 
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